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We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the judgments of climate 
scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3,367) about the 
factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of disagreement within climate 
science and astrophysics and about how one should respond to disagreements among 
experts. We found that, as compared to educated non-experts, climate experts believe that 
within climate science (i) there is less disagreement about climate change, (ii) 
methodological factors play less of a role in generating existing disagreements, (iii) fewer 
personal or institutional biases influence the nature and direction of climate research, (iv) 
there is more agreement among scientists about which methods or theoretical perspectives 
should be used to examine the relevant phenomena, (v) disagreements about climate 
change should not lead people to conclude that the scientific methods being employed are 
unreliable, and (vi) climate science is more settled than ideological pundits would have us 
believe and settled enough to base public policy on it. In addition, we observed that the 
uniquely American political context predicted experts’ judgments about some of these 
factors. We also found that, in regard to disagreements concerning cosmic ray physics, and 
commensurate with the greater inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in their field, 
astrophysicists working on cosmic rays were generally more willing to acknowledge expert 
disagreement, more open to the idea that a set of data can have multiple valid 
interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a non-standard 
view as non-expert, than climate scientists were in regard to climate science.  
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1. Introduction 
In today’s complex societies, many policy decisions depend crucially upon expert advice 
and opinion. But experts can and do disagree, sometimes vehemently, and not all their 
disagreements are easily adjudicated. An immediate question facing policy makers, and in 
particular those involved in decisions concerning some of the greatest challenges facing 
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humanity, such as environmental policy, is how to react to persistent disagreement among 
experts. A further issue concerns how to respond to the sorry corollary of scientific 
disagreements, viz., the frequent misrepresentation and misunderstanding of them in the 
media and civic society. 
 The current paper is the output of an interdisciplinary investigation, involving 
scientists and philosophers, of the ill understood, but socially and politically significant 
phenomenon of expert peer disagreement. The ultimate goal of the project is to gain a better 
understanding of the role and consequences of disagreement among scientific experts and 
its impact on policy decisions by governmental agencies and the formation of public 
opinion. We examined cases of expert scientific disagreement in a field that is relatively 
free of economic and political pressures (cosmic ray physics) and contrasted it with expert 
disagreements in a field where significant economic and political interests are at stake 
(climate science).1  
 Existing studies of the opinions of climate scientists (Oreskes 2004, Bray & von 
Storch 2008, Anderegg et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2013, Stenhouse et al. 2014, Cook et al. 
2016) and the general public (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et al. 2010, Leiserowitz 
et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 2017) have shown 
significant disparities in their assessments of the extent of disagreement or consensus 
within climate science. These studies have not, however, examined the views of climate 
experts and non-experts in regard to the various personal, methodological, or institutional 
factors that these individuals think generate expert disagreement or how they think such 
disagreements should be approached. These studies also do not compare disagreements 
                                                   
 1 Cf. the online supplementary materials document that accompanies this article for a summary of 
the key disagreements among experts in cosmic ray physics. 
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about climate science to disagreements in other scientific domains. Thus, the central 
questions we investigated included the following: 
(D1) In the politically charged discipline of climate science, are there significant 
differences between the opinions of climate scientists, climate policy 
experts, and non-experts regarding the extent and causes of disagreement 
within that discipline? 
(D2) Are there significant differences between the opinions of climate scientists, 
climate policy experts, and non-experts about the extent to which 
disagreement is due to what we call “epistemic” factors—i.e., familiar 
forms of scientific uncertainty and legitimate differences in expert’s views 
of the quality of the relevant data and methods—and “nonepistemic” 
factors—i.e., the influence of scientists’ own ideologies, personal values, or 
non-scientific beliefs (such as their political views), which may serve to bias 
their scientific work in various ways.2 
(D3) What do climate scientists, climate policy experts, and astrophysicists take to 
be the most appropriate reaction to scientific disagreements within their 
fields? In particular, (a) should persistent disagreement regarding a given 
theory decrease our confidence in that theory? And (b) does persistent 
disagreement lead lay people to have doubts about the possibility of 
objectivity within that domain? 
                                                   
 2 What we refer to as ‘non-epistemic’ factors here corresponds roughly to what Longino (1990: 4-
6) calls ‘contextual values’, i.e. the personal, social, and cultural values that belong to the broader context in 
which science is done. However, for those familiar with Longino’s terminology, it is worth noting that our 
notion of an ‘epistemic’ factor is broader than Longino’s notion of a ‘constitutive value’. 
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(D4) What effects does scientific disagreement have on the field in question? In 
particular, are disagreements perceived as good for the health of the 
discipline itself and what effects does publicizing disagreement have on 
public trust in science? 
We examined these issues using two questionnaires. We observed significant between-
group differences in perceptions of the extent and causes of disagreement in climate science 
and significant differences between responses to the two scientific disciplines we studied.  
 Our research questions and interpretations are informed by recent discussions 
within philosophy regarding disagreement between equally competent and otherwise 
equally well-informed agents—so-called ‘peer disagreements’ (Christensen 2007, 2009; 
Feldman 2006; Goldman 2010; Kelly 2005, 2010; Matheson 2015). A central issue at stake 
in cases of peer disagreement is the normative question of how someone should respond 
when she realizes that she is in such a situation, i.e., when she discovers that a peer 
disagrees with her.3 Each of the participant groups that were asked about climate science 
were disinclined to move closer to the opinion of peers who disagree with them about 
climate science. Astrophysicists, by contrast, were significantly inclined to adopt a 
conciliatory stance toward peers who disagreed with them about cosmic ray physics. 
Relatedly, we found that climate scientists, compared with astrophysicists, were more 
inclined to doubt that experts in their field who disagree with the dominant theoretical 
perspectives were as well informed as they are. This should perhaps not be surprising given 
the prevalence of ideological pundits masquerading as climate science experts in the media 
and elsewhere. The inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in the field of cosmic rays may 
                                                   
 3 Cf. the supplementary materials document for additional details about the philosophical debate. 
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also explain the willingness of astrophysicists working on cosmic rays to show greater 
tolerance towards non-standard views.  
 
2. Research Materials 
In order to investigate the research questions described above, the [name redacted] project 
hosted workshops with astrophysicists, climate scientists, climate policy experts, and 
philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement. At these workshops, we 
discussed our central research questions with each group and solicited their input on how 
we might investigate them using questionnaires. On the basis of these discussions, we 
constructed two questionnaires, the first of which (Questionnaire 1) focused on descriptive 
questions about factors that lead to persistent expert disagreement within climate science 
and cosmic ray physics. The second (Questionnaire 2) focused on normative questions such 
as the reasonability of expert disagreement within these fields and whether encounters with 
peers with whom one disagrees should make one less confident in one’s opinions. 
Questionnaire 2 also investigated the implications of persistent disagreement for public 
policy decisions, public trust in science, and assessments of the reliability of the scientific 
field in question.  
 Our goal was to construct questionnaires for each participant group that were as 
similar as possible—except for the domain of science about which we inquired—so that 
comparisons across groups would be possible. However, some differences in wording were 
necessary. These differences are noted with underlining, parentheses, and footnotes below. 
Climate scientists, climate policy experts, and the university students and alumni (whom 
we call ‘educated non-experts’) were asked about disagreement among climate science 
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experts. Our questions probed participants’ judgments about climate change and climate 
science as a whole, as opposed to particular areas or issues within climate science.4 
Astrophysicists who work on cosmic ray physics were asked only about disagreements 
within cosmic ray physics. The items featured in Questionnaire 1 appear in Table 1. 
 
We are interested in how climate scientists (astrophysicists) view 
disagreements about climate change (cosmic rays).5 
1.1 How much disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) is 
there among the experts in your field?6 
 
When considering the scientific methods and practices of your field, 
how important do you think the following factors are in the creation 
and persistence of disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray 
physics)? 
1.2 Those involved in the disagreement are not equally well informed. 
1.3 Those involved in the disagreement begin from different starting points, 
prior assumptions, or theoretically motivated expectations. 
1.4 Those involved in the disagreement highlight or focus on different kinds 
of data as evidence. 
1.5 Those involved in the disagreement have differing views of the 
appropriate scientific method. 
1.6 The issues about which experts in my field disagree are very complex. 
1.7 The data about which experts in my field disagree involve a great deal 
of uncertainty. 
1.8 It is difficult to obtain enough of the right kind of data needed to resolve 
the disagreements that arise. 
 
When considering the practices of other experts in your field, how 
important do you think the following factors are in the creation and 
persistence of disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray 
physics)? 
                                                   
 4 Some climate experts indicated that they would have liked to have commented on different aspects 
of the climate debate in different ways. However, because many members of the general public are unfamiliar 
with different aspects of the science of climate change and because we wanted to examine between-group 
differences on the same questions, we pitched our questions in this study at a general level. In a subsequent 
study, the results of which we do not report here, we asked different participant groups about particular issues 
within the overall climate debate. 
 5 For climate policy experts, we added “and climate policy experts” to “climate scientists.” The 
heading for educated non-experts read “We are interested in how members of the general public view 
disagreements about climate change among climate science experts.” 
 6 Throughout both questionnaires, the phrases ‘your field’ and ‘my field’ were changed to ‘climate 
science’ for educated non-experts. 
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1.9 Those involved in the disagreement are motivated by political ideology 
to defend particular theories. 
1.10 Those involved in the disagreement are motivated by financial 
incentives to defend particular theories. 
1.11 Those involved in the disagreement defend certain theories because 
those theories represent their life’s work and they cannot bear to give 
them up. 
1.12 Those involved in the disagreement are trying to garner attention or 
make a name for themselves. 
1.13 Those involved in the disagreement are simply being stubborn, closed-
minded, or unreasonable. 
Table 1. Elements of Questionnaire 1. 
 
The answer choices for Question 1.1 were ‘None,’ ‘Very little,’ ‘Some,’ and ‘A great deal.’ 
For purposes of analysis, these were scored as 0, 1, 2, and 3. The answer choices for 
Questions 1.2 through 1.13 were ‘Not important,’ ‘Slightly important,’ ‘Moderately 
important,’ ‘Important,’ and ‘Very important’ (scored as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4). All participants 
were asked demographic questions about their age, sex, education, and ethnicity or 
nationality. Experts were asked to describe the nature of their training and expertise. 
 In light of existing public opinion research (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et 
al. 2010, Leiserowitz et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 
2017), we hypothesized that experts and lay people would make divergent judgments about 
how much disagreement there was within climate science. Since scientific disagreements 
are rarely publicized except when connected to ideological, political, or religious disputes, 
we hypothesized that the non-experts would think that debates about climate science were 
driven more by ideological, social and personal factors than scientists in that field do. 
 The items featured on Questionnaire 2 appear in Table 2.  
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We are interested in how climate scientists (astrophysicists) view 
disagreements about climate change (cosmic rays). 
2.1 How much disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) is 
there among the experts in your field? 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following claims: 
2.2 Two experts who are equally well-informed about the science of climate 
change (cosmic ray physics) might look at the same data but reasonably 
arrive at different conclusions. 
2.3 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) may 
indicate that the tools or methods scientists use to study this 
phenomenon are not sufficiently reliable. 
2.4 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) may 
mean that there is no correct theory in this domain. 
2.5 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) may 
mean that there is more than one correct theory in this domain. 
2.6 When I find that other experts who are as well-informed as I am hold 
opinions about climate change (cosmic ray physics) that are 
significantly different from my own, this sometimes leads me to become 
less confident in my own opinions.7 
2.7 When I encounter an expert who disagrees with the dominant paradigms 
or theoretical perspectives in my field, this usually causes me to wonder 
whether they are really as well informed as other experts in the field. 
2.8 The peer review process in my field is biased against publishing 
controversial hypotheses about climate change (cosmic ray physics).8 
2.9 Minority or dissenting perspectives on climate change (cosmic ray 
physics) are often inappropriately silenced or suppressed within my 
field.9 
2.10 Disagreements about issues such as climate change (cosmic ray 
physics) can be good for the health of my field. 
2.11 When experts in my field disagree about climate change, it is most 
often about which public policy recommendations should be made in 
light of the science rather than about the science itself. 
2.12 Publicizing the extent of disagreement among experts in my field 
reduces public trust in science. 
2.13 Scientific experts should present their science to the general public 
without making any policy recommendations about what society should 
do in light of the science. 
2.14 The science of climate change is settled enough to base public policy 
on it. 
                                                   
 7 For educated non-experts, ‘other experts’ was changed to ‘other people.’ 
 8 Educated non-experts were given “The peer review process in climate science is probably biased 
against publishing controversial hypotheses about climate change.” 
 9 Educated non-experts were given “Minority or dissenting perspectives on climate change are 
probably often inappropriately silenced or suppressed within climate science.” 
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2.15 How much trust do you have in climate science experts? 
2.16 How much trust do you have in scientists working in other areas of 
science, e.g. astrophysics? 
Table 2. Elements of Questionnaire 2. 
 
 Question 2.1 was identical to Question 1.1, so that we could compare participants’ 
answers to other questions with their answers to this particular question on both 
questionnaires. The response choices for Questions 2.2 through 2.14 were ‘Completely 
disagree,’ ‘Mostly disagree,’ ‘Slightly disagree,’ ‘Neither agree nor disagree,’ ‘Slightly 
agree,’ ‘Mostly agree,’ and ‘Completely agree’ (scored as 1 through 7). Questions 2.11 and 
2.14 were not used in the version of Questionnaire 2 that was given to astrophysicists 
because there is not a visible public policy debate concerning cosmic ray physics. 
Questions 2.15 and 2.16 were presented only to educated non-experts. Answer choices for 
these latter two questions were ‘None,’ ‘Very little,’ ‘Some,’ and ‘A great deal’ (scored as 
0 through 3). All participants were asked the same demographic questions as in 
Questionnaire 1. 
 We hypothesized that, on the basis of scientists’ experience with ambiguous data, 
interpretive flexibility, and professional disagreements within their disciplines, scientists 
would give higher estimates than non-experts of how reasonable it can be for scientists 
within their fields to draw different conclusions from the same data set (Q2.2). We also 
tentatively hypothesized that scientists would be more circumspect or self-reflective when 
confronted with an equally informed but divergent opinion than non-experts (Q2.6 & 
Q2.7).  
 In the domain of morality, a number of philosophers (e.g., Ayer, 1936, Stevenson 
1944) have argued that there are no correct answers to questions about what is morally 
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right or wrong on the grounds that there is no objective way to resolve disagreements that 
arise concerning them. We hypothesized that persistent disagreement in climate science 
would lead lay people to have similar doubts about whether there are objective facts in this 
domain, or, at a minimum, whether they doubt that current scientific methods are capable 
of giving us knowledge of those facts (Q2.3, Q2.4 & Q2.5).  
 We hypothesized that educated non-experts would suspect that there was more 
inappropriate silencing within academic and scientific institutions than scientists would 
(Q2.8 & Q2.9). We hypothesized that climate scientists would be more likely than non-
experts to respond that the disagreements surrounding climate science did not actually fall 
within the science itself but rather lay in political debates about what to do in light of the 
science (Q2.11). We hypothesized that both experts and lay people would think that public 
discussions about the extent of disagreement within climate science have had a negative 
effect on public trust in science (Q2.13). Relatedly, we hypothesized that non-experts 
would express greater confidence in the results, methods, and authority of scientists 
working in other areas than of those working in climate science (Q2.15 & Q2.16). 
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3. Participants 
We recruited a total of 3,367 participants for our study from January to April, 2017. 
Participants were invited to complete either Questionnaire 1 or Questionnaire 2, which 
were made available online. Climate scientists, climate policy experts, and astrophysicists 
were recruited via professional listservs and newsletters. 457 climate scientists were 
recruited via messages to the following listservs that were selected because they represent 
major communication forums for experts in climate science: ecolog-l (maintained by the 
Ecological Society of America), coral-list (maintained by the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration’s Coral Reef Conservation Program and Atlantic 
Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory), cryolist (affiliated with the International 
Glaciological Society), arcticinfo (for arctic climate scientists), and marine-b (for marine 
biodiversity scientists). These participants were asked whether they considered themselves 
to be climate scientists and to provide the following information about the nature of their 
expertise: 
(E1) What scientific discipline do you work in? 
(E2) Number of years you have worked in this field (include years spent as Ph.D. 
student or postdoc): ______ 
(E3) Within your scientific discipline, what is your primary area of expertise? 
(E4) Highest degree earned: ______ 
Of the 457 respondents (41% female, ave. age = 43, ave. years experience = 17) who were 
deemed to be climate scientists, 92% had graduate degrees in their respective fields, with 
23% reporting expertise in atmospheric science (e.g., meteorology, atmospheric physics), 
44% in one of the earth sciences (incl. oceanography, glaciology, geology, hydrology), 
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44% in biological science (primarily ecology), and 5% in other sciences.10 200 climate 
policy experts (31% female, ave. age = 48, ave. years experience = 18) were recruited via 
messages to climate-l (maintained by the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development), which was selected because it is the primary English-language listserv for 
climate policy experts. Participants with expertise in climate policy were asked similar 
questions about the nature of their expertise. 92% of climate policy experts had graduate 
degrees in their fields and reported expertise in economics, law, political science, 
anthropology, resource management, conservation, agriculture, and philosophy. 99 
astrophysicists with expertise in cosmic ray physics (17% female, ave. age = 49, ave. years 
experience = 22) were recruited via an invitation in a bulletin of the International 
Astronomical Union Division D (High Energy Phenomena and Fundamental Physics) and 
listservs for researchers affiliated or collaborating with scientists at the Dublin Institute for 
Advanced Studies, the Pierre Auger Observatory (Argentina), and the High Energy 
Stereoscopic System (Namibia). Because the total global community of cosmic ray 
physicists is only a few hundred, this sample represents a good proportion of the scientists 
in this field. 91% of experts in cosmic ray physics have earned a doctoral degree. Among 
climate scientists 45% reported the U.S. as their nationality, as did 30% of climate policy 
experts and 17% of astrophysicists. 697 undergraduates enrolled at University College 
Dublin (52% female, ave. age = 23, 83% white Irish) were recruited via email with 
assistance from the UCD IT Services and Student Services offices. 1,914 alumni from the 
University at Buffalo (44% female, ave. age = 52, 82% Caucasian) were recruited via email 
with assistance from the UB Office of Development and Alumni Communications. 
                                                   
 10 These percentages sum to more than 100% because several scientists indicated expertise in more 
than one of our areas of classification. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Summary 
The mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items in Questionnaires 1 
and 2 are summarized below in Tables 3 and 4.11 For ease of reference, the rightmost 
column indicates the midpoint of the response scale for each item.  
  
                                                   
 11 Throughout this paper, we report mean rather than median responses, even though we often use 
nonparametric statistics to analyze these data, because we believe that means in the present case are more 
informative than medians. Additional information about these statistics can be found in the supplementary 
materials document. 
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Question Content Climate scientists 
Climate 
policy 
experts 
Under-
graduates Alumni 
Astro-
physicists Midpoint 
Q1.1 How much disagreement 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.0 1.5 
Q1.2 Not well-informed 2.3 2.4 3.0 3.0 1.8 2 
Q1.3 Different starting points 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2 
Q1.4 Different data 2.6 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.5 2 
Q1.5 Different methods 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.0 2 
Q1.6 Complex issues 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.6 2.9 2 
Q1.7 Uncertain data 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.6 2 
Q1.8 Difficult to obtain data 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.0 2 
Q1.9 Political ideology 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 0.9 2 
Q1.10 Financial incentives 2.1 2.0 3.2 3.2 1.2 2 
Q1.11 Life’s work 1.9 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.3 2 
Q1.12 Fame 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.9 2 
Q1.13 Stubbornness 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.4 2 
Table 3. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items 
in Questionnaire 1, along with an additional column indicating the midpoint 
of the relevant response scale. 
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Question Content Climate scientists 
Climate 
policy 
experts 
Under-
graduates Alumni 
Astro-
physicists Midpoint 
Q2.1 How much disagreement 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.0 1.5 
Q2.2 Different conclusions 3.6 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.8 4 
Q2.3 Unreliable methods 3.1 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.8 4 
Q2.4 No correct theory 2.3 2.7 2.9 3.2 4.3 4 
Q2.5 More than one correct theory 3.3 3.7 4.6 4.2 4.1 4 
Q2.6 Decreased confidence 3.6 3.2 3.5 2.9 4.5 4 
Q2.7 Doubt their expertise 5.0 5.0 4.7 4.8 4.1 4 
Q2.8 Biased peer review 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.8 4.0 4 
Q2.9 Dissent silenced 2.7 3.4 4.2 3.8 3.2 4 
Q2.10 Healthy disagreement 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.8 5.5 4 
Q2.11 Public policy disagreement 5.1 5.2 4.8 4.8 n/a 4 
Q2.12 Reduces trust 4.6 4.2 4.8 4.1 3.6 4 
Q2.13 Neutral on policy 3.6 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.7 4 
Q2.14 Settled enough 6.0 5.8 5.2 4.8 n/a 4 
Q2.15 
Trust in 
climate 
scientists 
n/a n/a 2.6 2.5 n/a 1.5 
Q2.16 Trust in other scientists n/a n/a 2.7 2.7 n/a 1.5 
Table 4. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items 
in Questionnaire 2, along with an additional column indicating the midpoint 
of the relevant response scale. 
 
4.2 Disagreement 
Questions 1.1 and 2.1 asked participants about the extent to which there is disagreement 
among experts about climate change or cosmic ray physics. Significant between-group 
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differences were observed (cf. Figure 1).12 Post-hoc tests performed on the answers of 
different pairs of participant groups indicated significant differences in every case, with the 
largest differences occurring between the answers of climate scientists and undergraduates 
(r = .37), climate scientists and alumni (r = .23), and climate scientists and astrophysicists 
(r = .44). The mean response of climate scientists fell significantly below the midpoint of 
1.5 (r = .46), whereas those of undergraduates (r = .28), alumni (r = .11), and 
astrophysicists (r = .66) fell significantly above the midpoint. The mean response of climate 
policy experts did not differ significantly from the midpoint.  
 Statistical note: Although r values are primarily known as measures of correlation 
strength, they can also be calculated as measures of effect size for a variety of statistical 
tests. While it is common in some disciplines to report different measures of effect size for 
different kinds of tests, an important benefit of reporting the same effect size measure for 
different tests is that it allows for easy comparisons between the sizes of different kinds of 
effects.13 
 
                                                   
 12 Kruskal-Wallis tests were used on each question to examine overall between-group differences. 
Pairwise differences were then examined with post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests. Cf. the supplementary materials 
document for further details concerning these tests and other statistics. 
 13 For correlations, r values indicate the strength of the correlation. For one-sample t-tests, r values 
indicate how large was the difference between the observed mean was and the neutral midpoint. For Mann-
Whitney tests, r values indicate how large was the difference between the two distributions being compared. 
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Figure 1. Mean responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined), organized 
by participant group. Error bars in all figures represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 Many climate scientists indicated expertise in more than one of the following three 
broad categories: atmospheric science, earth science, and ecology. Focusing only on the 
79% of climate scientists whose expertise fell squarely within only one of these categories, 
we observed significant between-group differences in how participants responded to 
Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (cf. Figure 2).14 Post-hoc pairwise tests found significant differences 
between the responses of atmospheric scientists and ecologists (r = .25) and between earth 
scientists and ecologists (r = .17). Thus, within our sample of climate scientists, the closer 
                                                   
 14 Kruskal-Wallis: H(2) = 17.48, p < .001. One-sample t-tests reveal that the mean response of 
atmospheric scientists did not differ significantly from the neutral midpoint of 1.5, whereas those of earth 
scientists (r = .42) and ecologists (r = .64) fell significantly below it. 
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a scientist’s area of expertise was to what is considered to be the core of climate science, 
the greater the level of disagreement that scientist was likely to report there being within 
that field.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined) of those 
climate scientists whose areas of expertise falls into a single broad category.  
 
 One possible explanation of this interesting finding is that different aspects of the 
climate debate may be salient to scientists from different disciplines and that these 
differences may shape their responses to our question. For example, a marine biologist who 
knows that rising global temperatures stress the ecosystems she studies may focus on the 
fact that climate scientists do not disagree at all about whether the planet is warming. 
However, an atmospheric physicist participating in our study who works on ‘climate 
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sensitivity’—i.e., the question of how much global surface temperatures would rise given 
a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide—may respond to our question in light of the fact 
that different models of climate sensitivity yield different estimates.  
 It is widely noted that the debate about climate change within the United States is 
markedly different than in other parts of the world. It is perhaps surprising, then, that the 
mean response to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined) of the American non-experts in our 
study fell significantly below that of the non-American non-experts (r = .08).15 We had 
expected that the greater controversy surrounding climate change in the U.S. would lead 
American participants to report greater disagreement among climate scientists than 
European non-experts. However, the opposite was the case. We also examined differences 
across nationalities in the responses of our climate experts. Again to our surprise, a Mann-
Whitney test revealed that the responses of American climate experts (M = 1.0) fell 
significantly below those of non-American climate experts (M = 1.4, r = .23).1617 
 Participants’ responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 may be shaped by the particular 
ways in which alleged disagreements within climate science are often leveraged for 
political ends, especially within the American context. Since experts in the U.S. know that 
any indication of disagreement or uncertainty about climate change that might appear in 
their responses could be used or even distorted by climate skeptics, they may feel pressure 
                                                   
 15 U = 602,039.00, p < .0001. 
 16 U = 35,421.50, p < .00001. 
 17 Although we did not gather data on participants’ political orientation, it seems likely that 
university alumni will be more conservative politically than either undergraduates or climate scientists and 
that this fact might lead alumni to report greater disagreement within climate science than either of the other 
groups. Although we did observe higher ratings on Q1.1 and Q2.1 among alumni than among climate climate 
scientists, the ratings of alumni were not higher than those of undergraduates. Nevertheless, political 
orientation is likely to interact with participants’ ratings in a number of ways, some of which we are 
examining in a follow up study. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing some of these points to our 
attention. 
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to downplay the extent of disagreement that they know exists. Another possibility is that 
different aspects of the climate debate may be salient to participants from different 
countries. In the U.S., admitting the very basic fact that the planet is warming is viewed as 
a strongly liberal stance. In other contexts where everyone agrees that the planet is 
warming, a question about the extent of disagreement within climate science may bring to 
mind other issues or questions, some of which may involve more uncertainty or 
disagreement than the basic question of increasing average temperature.  
 As compared to educated non-experts, climate experts more strongly agreed on 
Question 2.11 that disagreement within climate science concerned the public policy 
recommendations that should be made in light of the science rather than the science itself. 
Each pairwise comparison between one expert group and one non-expert group was 
significant (r’s between .09 and .14). However, these differences were not as large as the 
results from Questions 1.1 and 2.1 led us to expect. Moreover, American climate experts 
(M = 5.4) more strongly agreed that disagreements about climate change were most often 
about public policy questions than about core scientific questions than non-American 
climate experts (M = 4.9, r = .19).18  
 
4.3 Epistemic Factors 
Questions 1.2 through 1.8 asked participants how important they thought various epistemic 
factors, as defined above, were to the emergence and persistence of disagreement about 
climate change or cosmic ray physics. The first half of these questions concerned the 
behaviors or attitudes of individual experts who are involved in scientific disagreements. 
                                                   
 18 U = 10,936.00, p < .01. 
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The remaining questions in this section concerned the phenomena studied by scientific 
experts—e.g., their complexity, uncertainty in the data, and how difficult it is to obtain the 
right kind of data. On the whole, climate scientists and climate policy experts rated the 
epistemic factors as being less important contributors to expert disagreement than non-
experts did.  
 Participants’ ratings of the importance of the epistemic factors represented in 
Questions 1.2 through 1.5 positively correlated with one another to a noteworthy extent 
(r’s .23 to .46, all p’s < .000001), and their ratings of the factors in 1.6 through 1.8 
correlated even more strongly (r’s .37 to .64, all p’s < .000001). Correlations between 
factors from the two groups correlated less strongly or failed to correlate significantly at 
all. Participants’ ratings on Questions 1.4 through 1.8 also significantly predicted how 
much disagreement they thought there was within climate science or cosmic ray physics 
(r’s .18 to .36, all p’s < .000001). 
 There were no significant differences between the responses of the two groups of 
climate experts on any of these questions and the two groups of non-experts were generally 
in agreement about them. Importantly, the responses of climate experts in general differed 
from those of non-experts.  
 Post-hoc comparisons between climate scientists and astrophysicists revealed 
significant differences in their responses to Questions 1.2, 1.6, and 1.8 (r’s = .16, .15, .25), 
with astrophysicists being less likely to think that disagreements in their field were due to 
some of the experts being less well-informed and more likely to think that the issues about 
which experts disagree are very complex and that it is difficult to obtain enough of the right 
kind of data needed to resolve disagreements. In regard to the other epistemic factors, 
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climate scientists and astrophysicists gave largely similar responses. Experts in both fields 
indicated that there is agreement among experts about the methods, theoretical frameworks, 
and data that are needed to address the phenomena they study.  
 One reason the mean response of climate experts to Question 1.2 fell significantly 
below those of educated non-experts may be that the general public is frequently exposed 
to poorly informed ‘experts’ through popular media—pundits who are in fact not climate 
scientists and thus not part of the community of scientists with which climate scientists 
would be having a scientific discussion. Hence, what gets perceived as expert disagreement 
by the public may not be taken as disagreement among genuine experts by those working 
within the field. 
 In response to Questions 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5, climate scientists and climate policy 
experts gave lower ratings of the extent to which expert disagreement within climate 
science was due to different starting points, focusing on different kinds of data, or differing 
views about the appropriate methods to use than did undergraduates or alumni.  
 Comparing the responses of experts and non-experts to Questions 1.2 through 1.5 
to their responses to Questions 1.6 through 1.8, we see that both experts and non-experts 
largely agree that climate science involves uncertainties, deals with complex phenomena, 
and faces difficulties in obtaining the right kind of data. However, experts think that there 
is more theoretical or methodological agreement within their fields about how these 
epistemic fallibilities should be addressed or approached than non-experts do. Cosmic ray 
physicists gave largely similar answers to climate experts, except that the former rated the 
complexity of the phenomena they study and the difficulty of obtaining enough of the right 
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kind of data about them as more important contributors to scientific disagreement within 
their field. 
 
4.4 Nonepistemic Factors 
Items in the second half of Questionnaire 1 examined participants’ judgments about the 
extent to which disagreements about climate change and cosmic ray physics are nurtured 
by political ideology (Q1.9), financial incentives (Q1.10), professional stake (Q1.11), 
careerism (Q1.12), or the psychological factor of stubbornness (Q1.13). The opinions of 
the non-experts paint a more negative picture of the state of climate science than those of 
practitioners within the field. 
 Participants’ ratings of the importance of the nonepistemic factors represented in 
Questions 1.9 through 1.13 all strongly correlated with one another (r’s .30 to .70, all p’s 
< .000001). There were no significant differences between climate scientists and climate 
policy experts on any of the nonepistemic questions, and undergraduates and alumni 
differed slightly on only one question. By contrast, the responses of climate experts differed 
significantly from educated non-experts on almost all questions (r’s .09 to .38). The 
responses of astrophysicists differed significantly from those of all groups on Questions 
1.9 and 1.10 (r’s .24 to .54) but exhibited fewer differences on the other questions. 
 The responses of scientific experts to Question 1.9 and 1.10 differed sharply from 
those of the educated non-experts, with the latter giving substantially higher ratings of the 
importance of these factors. All participant groups largely agreed that trying to make a 
name for oneself (Q1.12) and stubbornness, closed-mindedness, and unreasonableness 
(Q1.13) were considerably less significant nonepistemic factors. 
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 For each participant, we averaged together their response to each question about 
epistemic factors (Q1.2 – Q1.8) and their response to each nonepistemic question (Q1.9 – 
Q1.13), resulting in a composite epistemic score and a composite nonepistemic score. 
Mean composite scores for each group are represented in Figure 3. A two-way mixed 
ANOVA revealed significant main effects for participant group and composite score type 
(epistemic vs. nonepistemic), along with a significant interaction between group and score 
type.19 In other words, (i) for a given composite score type, the scores of the groups differed 
significantly, (ii) for a given participant group, there were significant differences between 
their epistemic and nonepistemic scores, and (iii) the extent to which a participant group’s 
epistemic and nonepistemic scores differed varied across groups.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean composite scores for questions about epistemic and 
nonepistemic factors on Questionnaire 1, organized by participant group. 
                                                   
 19 Group: F(4, 1624) = 38.59, p < .00001. Score type: F(1, 1624) = 83.14, p < .00001. Group * score 
type: F(4, 1624) = 15.90, p < .00001. 
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 The epistemic and nonepistemic composite scores were nearly identical for both 
undergraduates and alumni. In contrast, each of the three groups of experts gave lower 
ratings of the importance of nonepistemic factors in climate science and cosmic ray 
physics. Notably, climate experts’ estimates of the importance of nonepistemic factors 
were a good bit higher than those of astrophysicists.  
 Among climate experts, there were no significant differences between the 
composite epistemic scores of Americans and non-Americans, nor were there any 
differences across nationalities between the composite nonepistemic scores of American 
and non-American climate experts. On the whole, then, non-experts gave significantly 
higher ratings of the importance of both epistemic and nonepistemic factors in creating 
expert disagreement, and large differences were observed between experts and non-experts 
concerning non-epistemic factors such as political ideology, financial incentives, biases, 
and the need to defend one’s life’s work.  
 We believe that educated non-experts’ ratings of the importance of nonepistemic 
factors indicates a significant lack of trust in professional scientists. In many studies of 
public trust in science (e.g., Pew 2015), members of the general public often indicate a lack 
of trust in particular scientific findings or in the ability of scientists to understand certain 
phenomena (e.g., health). One can get the impression that it is perhaps the scientific method 
that they distrust. However, at least in our data, the lack of trust that educated non-experts 
display is more strongly directed more toward individuals working within scientific 
institutions (as represented by participants’ composite nonepistemic scores) than toward 
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the methods employed by those scientists (as represented by their composite epistemic 
scores). 
 
4.5 Normative Issues I: The Epistemology of Disagreement 
We turn now to data from Questionnaire 2 that concern normative epistemological issues 
such as whether it can be reasonable to draw different conclusions from the same data 
(Q2.2), whether participants decrease their confidence when faced with an equally well-
informed person who disagrees with them (Q2.6), and whether participants conclude that 
someone with an atypical view is not actually as well informed as those with more standard 
views (Q2.7). Participants’ responses to Questions 2.2, 2.6, and 2.7 were significantly 
correlated. Participants who took a more permissive stance toward evidence (Q2.2)—by 
indicating that two equally well-informed experts might look at the same data but 
reasonably arrive at different conclusions (see White 2005)—were significantly more 
likely to take a conciliatory stance toward peer disagreement (Q2.6) (r = .18, p < .000001)20 
and were significantly less likely to judge that someone with a divergent opinion was not 
actually well-informed (Q2.7) (r = -.20, p < .000001). Participants who adopted a 
conciliatory attitude (Q2.6) were significantly less likely to judge that people holding 
divergent opinions were not well-informed (Q2.7) (r = -.06, p = .02).  
 On Question 2.2, the responses of climate scientists differed significantly from 
those of every other group (r’s .14 to .26), with climate scientists being more likely to deny 
                                                   
 20 In the philosophical literature on disagreement, there is some discussion of whether a positive 
answer to Q2.6—i.e., to what philosophers call conciliationism – entails, presupposes, or is otherwise 
strongly connected to a negative answer to Q2.2—an idea known as uniqueness (see White 2005, Kelly 2010, 
Ballantyne and Coffman 2012, Christensen 2016). It appears that our participants did not recognize this 
alleged connection between conciliationism and uniqueness, at least not within the domains in question. 
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there is more than one uniquely reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from a set of 
climate data. The responses of undergraduates, alumni, and astrophysicists did not differ 
significantly among themselves. Note that climate scientists were asked only about the 
science of climate change, so that it is possible that they might well adopt a more 
permissive approach to scientific evidence in other, less politicized domains. 
 On Question 2.6, the mean responses of climate scientists, climate policy experts, 
undergraduates, and alumni all fell significantly below the midpoint, indicating a 
disinclination to modify their views in light of contrary opinions about climate science. By 
contrast, astrophysicists were significantly inclined to modify their views upon learning 
about other experts in cosmic ray physics who disagreed with them. Again, these data do 
not indicate that climate scientists and non-experts endorse a steadfast approach to peer 
disagreement across the board, since they might well adopt a more conciliatory approach 
in less politicized areas of science or everyday life. On Question 2.7, the mean responses 
of all four participant groups who were asked about climate change fell significantly above 
the midpoint, indicating a significant tendency to think that someone out of step with the 
mainstream with regard to climate science was not really a well-informed expert after all. 
The mean response of astrophysicists did not differ from the midpoint.  
 
4.6 Normative Issues II: Objectivity 
Questions 2.3 through 2.5 probed participants’ judgments about the ways in which expert 
disagreement might underwrite the conclusion that there is a lack of epistemological or 
metaphysical objectivity within the disputed domain. Participant groups were significantly 
divided on these questions. All pairwise post-hoc between-group comparisons on Question 
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2.3 were significant (r’s .09 to .34), except for that between undergraduates and alumni. 
The mean responses of climate scientists, climate policy experts, undergraduates, and 
alumni all fell significantly below the midpoint on Question 2.4 (r’s .36 to .74), but there 
were important differences regarding how far below the midpoint these scores fell. The 
mean response of climate scientists to this question was their lowest on Questionnaire 2. 
In response to Question 2.5, the mean responses of undergraduates and alumni fell 
significantly above the midpoint, while that of climate scientists fell significantly above. 
Thus, climate scientists and climate policy experts strongly rejected the idea that the often 
exaggerated and politicized disagreements about climate science that exist should lead 
people to skeptical conclusions about whether there are objective facts about the nature of 
climate change, whether those facts can be known, and whether current scientific methods 
are equal to the task of uncovering them.  
4.7 Institutional Issues 
Questions 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 examined participants’ judgments about institutional biases 
and the benefits of expert disagreement within the relevant domains. The responses of 
climate scientists differed significantly from those of every other group (r’s .16 to .79) on 
Questions 2.8 and 2.9. That is, climate experts indicated that they did not think the 
professional debate about climate change, as represented in academic journals and other 
venues, involved significant bias against minority views, with climate scientists expressing 
this opinion more strongly than climate policy experts. Undergraduates suspected to a 
certain degree that institutional bias was present, and alumni seemed uncertain about 
whether or not this was the case.  
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 When we put the data from Questions 2.8 and 2.9 together with the data from the 
questions about nonepistemic factors in Section 4.4 above, we get the unfortunate 
conclusion that educated non-experts think there is more personal and institutional bias 
operative within climate science than do climate experts themselves.21 These data seem to 
point to a crisis of trust in the men and women who work in climate science today. 
 The mean responses of all participant groups to Question 2.10 fell significantly 
above the midpoint, with that of astrophysicists being the highest. Thus, despite the fact 
that disagreements within science can sometimes be exploited for ideological aims, climate 
scientists and climate policy experts still agree that disagreement can be good for the health 
of their field.  
 There were significant correlations between participants’ answers to Question 2.10 
and their answers to 2.2 and 2.6. The more someone agreed that two experts could look at 
the same data but reasonably arrive at different conclusions (Q2.2), the more likely they 
were to think that disagreement could be good for a scientific discipline (Q2.10) (r = .31, 
p < .000001). Participants who reported taking a conciliatory approach to peer 
disagreement (Q2.6) were also significantly more likely to think disagreement could be 
good for science (Q2.10) (r = .23, p < .000001).  
 
4.8 Public Trust in Science 
As compared to other participant groups, climate scientists and undergraduates more 
strongly agreed that publicizing disagreement about climate change among scientific 
experts reduces public trust in science (Q2.12). The two groups of non-experts in our study 
                                                   
 21 We suspect that among non-experts without a college education this disparity may be even more 
pronounced. 
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were asked how much trust they have in climate science experts (Q2.15) and how much 
trust they have in scientists working in other areas of science (Q2.16). The mean response 
of each group fell significantly and substantially above the neutral midpoint for both 
questions (r’s .81 to .92—the largest effect sizes reported in this study). The confidence 
that each group expressed in climate scientists was significantly lower than the confidence 
they expressed in other scientists. There were no significant differences between the two 
participant groups. Thus, while non-experts express less confidence in climate scientists 
than other scientists, they express very high levels of confidence in both. 
 
4.9 Public Policy 
The remaining two questions from Questionnaire 2 concerned the public policy 
implications of expert disagreement. The mean responses of all participants except 
astrophysicists to Question 2.13 fell significantly below the midpoint. Thus, participants 
disagreed to a modest extent that scientists should keep out of public policy discussions. 
All participant groups (excluding astrophysicists, who were not asked this question) agreed 
on Question 2.14 that the science of climate change was settled enough for policy purposes, 
with climate experts agreeing most strongly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The goals of our study were to investigate the views of climate experts, astrophysicists, 
and educated non-experts in regard to the various methodological, personal, and 
institutional factors that these individuals think generate and sustain expert disagreement 
within climate science and cosmic ray physics and to examine how these participant groups 
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think such disagreements should be approached. By investigating participants’ judgments 
about the factors underlying disagreements among scientific experts, we aim to supplement 
existing findings regarding the opinions of scientific experts and the general public, which 
are typically pitched at a more general level. By examining individuals’ opinions about 
issues pertaining to the epistemology of disagreement in specific contexts, we hope that 
our findings can inform philosophical discussions about these epistemological matters, 
which take place at an especially high level of abstraction and generality.  
 We observed that, as compared with educated non-experts, climate experts believe 
that within climate science (i) there is less disagreement within climate science about 
climate change, (ii) more of the disagreement that does exist concerns public policy 
questions rather than the science itself, (iii) methodological factors play less of a role in 
generating existing disagreement among experts about climate science, (iv) fewer personal 
and institutional biases influence the nature and direction of climate science research, (v) 
there is more agreement among scientists about which methods or theoretical perspectives 
should be used to examine and explain the relevant phenomena, (vi) disagreements about 
climate change should not lead people to conclude that the scientific methods being 
employed today are unreliable or incapable of revealing the truth, and (vii) climate science 
is more settled than ideological pundits would have us believe and settled enough to base 
public policy on it. We also observed that the uniquely American political context predicted 
participants’ judgments in some of these domains.  
 Our study also reveals that, as compared to climate scientists, astrophysicists 
working in cosmic ray physics were generally more willing to acknowledge expert 
disagreement within cosmic ray physics, more open to the idea that a set of data can have 
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multiple valid interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a 
non-standard view as non-expert, than climate scientists. This was commensurate with the 
greater inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in their field. Experts in both climate science 
and astrophysics indicated that there is strong agreement within their fields about the 
methods, theoretical frameworks, and data that are needed to address the phenomena they 
study. 
 In line with existing studies of the opinions of climate scientists (Oreskes 2004, 
Bray & von Storch 2008, Anderegg et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2013, Stenhouse et al. 2014, 
Cook et al. 2016) and the general public (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et al. 2010, 
Leiserowitz et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 2017), our 
findings show that despite the existence of a significant consensus on the causes of climate 
change among climate scientists, the general public continues to believe that climate 
scientists disagree over the fundamental cause of global warming. Our study goes beyond 
previous studies in examining (i) differences between expert and non-expert populations 
in regard to the factors these different groups think underlie expert disagreement in climate 
science, (ii) the attitudes of experts and non-experts toward normative issues of expert 
disagreement, and (iii) and how experts from politicized and depoliticized areas of science 
compare on various metrics. It is hoped that these results will inform our understanding of 
the nature and broader social consequences of expert disagreement. 
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